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d e a n ’s m e s s a g e

dear alumni and friends,

b r adl e y s l ad e

T

he school year is upon us. This fall, mixed with the usual excitement and
anticipation, there is some relief as we come to the close of a summer filled with
dust and hammering from three major building projects on the second floor
of the Law School. With the support of the university, and with funds from
alumni and friends, we have built a beautiful new trial courtroom, a spacious
student commons, and a large, quiet, study area in our library, which replaces a
similar area on the fourth floor that will now be used for Law School conferences
and symposia. Each project addresses long-standing student and Law School needs,
and—exciting to me—their functional value is matched by their aesthetic quality.
I am eager for you to drop by the Law School to see the improvements. The trial
courtroom is particularly stunning, with finely detailed cherry-wood millwork and
all of the latest trial practice technologies.
It is hard not to feel excitement about the aesthetic and technical advances these projects represent, but I hope a summer of hard hats has not gone to my head. This school, after all, welcomed its first class to the St. Francis Elementary
School on Ninth East. The core of a legal education is not found in the construction of courtrooms and commons but
in the construction and development of critical and analytical thinking skills. That construction project, which likewise
can involve disruption and indeed some hammering, is one that goes on every year and is surely the most important “construction project” this fall.
Understood in its proper frame, I hope, improving the quality of the space in which students learn can have important symbolic value. The careful workmanship of the craftsmen who have done the molding and carving of the cherry
millwork is, perhaps, a reminder of the careful craftsmanship that is required of a successful lawyer. Attention to detail
matters. Understanding both the narrow frame of a particular panel, as well as how one frame (or analytical point) fits the
entire project, matters.
Perhaps I focus on the symbolism because I am eager to explore additional ways to improve the physical spaces in which
students learn and engage at the Law School. I’d love, for example, to see more natural light. In fact, in arming myself for
discussions with the university, I did some research on the value of natural light in learning environments and was interested
to find studies suggesting that students in purely fluorescent-light environments were shorter on average and more prone to
dental decay. All will likely be relieved to learn that I have not led with an argument for producing taller law students with
whiter teeth, but the idea of bringing more light to the Law School is an appealing project. Ultimately, of course, any effort
to bring physical light to the Law School remains secondary to the primary occupation of learning and discovering more
powerful light and truth and then taking it from the Law School as the guide by which to serve and to lead.
The Law School continues to be blessed with extraordinarily fine materials for our long-term construction project.
The class that joins us this fall is highly accomplished and capable of building with the same quality as those who have
gone before them. As described in further detail in our forthcoming Law School Annual Report, our faculty continue to
devote themselves to their craft, investing in the students and in advancing knowledge in their respective areas of the law.
And, as my experience with graduates across the country attests, the service and leadership of our alumni are evidence
that, in the most important sense, light has been incorporated into the Law School construction project.

						Warm regards,

								 j a m e s r . r a s b a n d
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stated goals of law school was to teach

the young acolytes how to “think like a lawyer.” I’m not sure quite as much is made of this
in today’s law schools, perhaps because figuring out exactly what that phrase means is not
easy, and lawyers tend to abandon projects they cannot explain with precision. Still, the idea
endures that we have a way of thinking about things that sets us apart, that can be taught,

and that serves us well. And I think there is some truth to it.

>>

I’m not going to attempt a pre-

cise explanation today of what it means to think like a lawyer. But I am going to talk about some
traits of lawyers’ minds and suggest that while

The following remarks were presented
to J. Reuben Clark Law
Society at the University of Oregon
on November 5, 2010.

they can be useful, they have their downside. For
this reason, only two cheers.

>>

I want to discuss

three traits of thinking like a lawyer and show
their strengths. But then I want to turn these
traits on their heads and show their weaknesses.

i l l u s t r a t i o n s b y j o n c. l u n d

g

assume nothing

One trait of the lawyer mind is to
assume nothing. The classic story
that used to be told about this trait
was of the senior partner and the
young associate traveling on a
train together. The young lawyer
looks out the window and says, “Look, all
the sheep have been sheared,” to which the
wise old partner replies, “Well, at least on one
side.” While the trait of assuming nothing
can be annoying to others and frustrating to
young lawyers, it has its uses.
For one thing, it combats groupthink,
or commonly held assumptions—the things
everybody knows but are actually unexamined; such as the commonly held assumption in a community that John Doe is guilty
of some notorious crime or that Jane Doe
is incapable of harming a flea. The lawyer approaches such assumptions with an
open mind: the task is to break down what
we know about what happened into component parts, assume nothing, and examine the facts with care. I once heard Paul
Fortino, a partner at Perkins Coie who represented Guantanamo detainees, say it this
way: “I felt that as to my client, terrorist is a
question, not an answer.”
I remember in my first year of law
school when I first realized this was a way
of thinking that lawyers knew and I didn’t. I
had a criminal law professor named Woody
Deem, a former star practitioner with an
unorthodox style. One part of his unorthodoxy was the pop quiz. That day’s quiz was
on larceny, the taking and carrying away of
the personal property of another with the
intent to permanently deprive the owner
of it. The quiz involved a man breaking in,
grabbing the homeowner’s baby, discarding the blanket and pacifier, and running
out of the house into the cold night with
a baby wearing only a diaper. I thought
I had law school figured out; it was clear
to me that the trick was that the man had
not stolen any personal property, just the
baby. Of course, I got the question wrong.
In a later phone call to my dad, a lawyer, I
complained about the ridiculous question.
I explained it to him, and by the time I got
to the discarded blanket, he interrupted me
and asked, “Was there a diaper? Because
that would be larceny.”
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This pattern of thinking, of assuming
nothing and examining everything, isn’t
unique to lawyers. We share it with good
economists and with legendary figures like
Perry Mason, Sherlock Holmes, Colombo,
and Monk.
While we have discussed this as “assuming nothing,” we are really nudging up
against a question of epistemology: How
do we know what we think we know? And
what is the core point of epistemology? As
the inimicable Tyler Cowan put it, “You
are wrong so, so, so often. This is, or rather
should be, the central lesson of epistemology
[and, I would add, a good legal education]. It
is a lesson which hardly anybody ever learns.”
What would a thoughtful trial lawyer
have learned along these lines? Here is my
partial list:
1. That eyewitnesses are sometimes dead
wrong and are often wrong on important
details
2. That honest people can remember the
same events differently
3. That the same facts can give rise to very
different inferences
4. That in even the most ordinary historical
events, it can be very difficult to figure out
what happened
5. That in most debates, the best argument
has serious flaws, while the worst argument
has undeniable strengths
6. That in a tight spot most people will still
try to be truthful
7. That you don’t really know something—
or even less, know it’s true—just because
you read it somewhere
8. That most experts don’t know what they
think they know

A mind trained along these lines would
approach most issues and disputes with
a certain degree of care, of openness to
change, of willingness to re-examine, of
unwillingness to assume that anyone who
disagrees with him or her is an idiot. This
does not mean that we never come to know
anything. It does mean that we have a highly
tuned awareness of the limits on our ability
to know. It is captured for me in the words
of Learned Hand, in his 1944 Fourth of July
speech in Central Park:
What then is the spirit of liberty? I cannot
define it; I can only tell you my own faith. The
spirit of liberty is the spirit which is not too sure that
it is right; the spirit of liberty is the spirit which seeks
to understand the minds of other men and women;
the spirit of liberty is the spirit which weighs their
interests alongside its own without bias; the spirit
of liberty remembers that not even a sparrow falls to
the earth unheeded; the spirit of liberty is the spirit
of Him who, near two thousand years ago, taught
mankind the lesson that it has never learned but
never quite forgotten; that there may be a kingdom
where the least shall be heard and considered side by
side with the greatest.
It’s worth stepping back to ask where this
lawerly, careful style of thinking comes from.
That is, what has driven lawyers to think this
way? In my view, it principally is the product of an adversarial system. It is born in the
dualistic dialectic of trials. The caution that
is so common to lawyers comes from having
your every assertion tested and attacked by an
adversary. In the experience of most people,
this is unheard of. The average doctor, college
professor, TV host, cab driver, or contractor
rarely has a highly motivated, skilled adver-

sary try to take apart his every assertion, with
the winner gaining a pot of money. And the
focus on proof, instead of pronouncement,
comes from the requirement of meeting a
certain standard of proof as to each element
of your case, or you lose.
In any event, this way of thinking—
focusing on proof, not assumptions, and
carefully linking your proof to your propositions—can be very useful. So I commend to
you the trait of assuming nothing.
e l i m i n at e i r r e l e va n c i e s

I want to turn now to a second
trait of thinking like a lawyer: the
skill of focusing on what’s relevant and eliminating irrelevancies. Isn’t this, in your own
experience, one of the main ways you find
yourself silently—or openly—critiquing the
comments of others? “Well, that doesn’t really
support the original proposition.” There is
probably no other way the casual comments
of nonlawyers trying to prove a point are more
different from lawyer’s comments than in
their tendency to rely on irrelevancies. Of
course, even lawyers are not immune.
Someone in your organization, for example,
put out the proposition that you needed an
interesting and charismatic speaker. To which
somebody responded, “I know a federal judge
who will do it.” Which, as you can now see,
is utterly irrelevant to the proposition.
This ability to eliminate irrelevancies
can be very useful in eliminating bias and
prejudice. In a recent pleading, for example,
in a Fair Labor Standards Act case, the plaintiff’s lawyer made sure to mention that the
defendant/company owner was a “Russian
immigrant and convicted federal felon.”
Credibility was not an issue in the early
pleadings on class certification. It didn’t take
long for his opponent to point out that the
whole comment was completely irrelevant,
and, in fact, completely improper.
The lawyer’s efforts to eliminate irrelevancies and focus on what actually matters
and to get juries to do the same can be a very
laudable thing. It means that despite your
immigration status, your criminal record,
your race, your income, or your political
affiliation, you have a shot at justice. So I
commend to you the trait of eliminating
irrelevancies.

The lawyer’s
efforts to
eliminate irrelevancies
and focus on
what actually
matters and to
get juries to
do the same

It means that

can be a very

despite your

laudable thing.

immigration status,
your criminal
record, your
race, your
income, or
your political
affiliation,

you have a shot at justice.
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s t r i c t a p p l i c at i o n o f
neutral rules

In addition to focusing on
the relevant, the law tends
to reward and require the
strict application of neutral
rules. In my work, in particular, I
am often called upon to determine the legally
“correct” answer and then stop right there.
I apply neutral rules, determine what result
those rules dictate, and then in many cases
my work is done. Maybe sea lions die, maybe
a really nice person gets fired, or maybe a
business loses the patent it needs to survive.
Not always, but often, the law turns a blind
eye to the consequences that may flow from
the application of legal rules.
While this sounds like a grave weakness
to some, it can be a significant strength in
the application of the law. For example:
When I am considering the fair and
just sentence for a defendant, I will often
receive the most heartrending letters from
his family, even from his children, begging
me not to send their son/husband/daddy to
prison, or their lives will be ruined. What
use do you think I ought to make of this
information? I think the answer, at least in
calculating the Sentencing Guidelines, is:
very little. Or, to put it another way, how
would you feel if you were the very next
defendant being sentenced for the same
conduct, and you didn’t happen to come
from a lovely family who were good at
writing letters?
There are all kinds of rules keeping out
powerful, relevant evidence: confessions,
smoking guns, fingerprints, dna, and the
like. Many nonlawyers think the cost of
these exclusions is always too high. I’m not
here to defend them always, in all cases. But
there is this strength: The exclusions happen according to neutral rules that operate
in favor of the least popular group in society,
and they get applied with some regularity
even in the face of that unpopularity.
So, we focus on proof and don’t make
assumptions, we screen out irrelevancies,
and we stick with the strict application of
neutral rules. This helps us make more accurate decisions, avoid bias and prejudice, and
apply neutral rules in an evenhanded way—
all in all, not bad. Two cheers for thinking
like a lawyer.
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But there are costs. Sometimes, those
costs can be very high, even catastrophic.
It’s worth thinking about the ways we think
as lawyers that blind us to a better way. It’s
worth examining these same basic traits for
their doppelganger, their weaknesses.
av o i d i n g a s s u m p t i o n s :
h a l f way t h r o u g h t h e
bramble bush

Let’s return to the trait
of avoiding assumptions.
Sometimes, not making
assumptions isn’t the path to accuracy.
Instead, it is the path to foolishness.
Take, for example, the story of the
sheared sheep. How many flocks of sheep
in the universe are sheared on one side only?
In the real world, the world in which people
have to make decisions without perfect
information, the answer is, not enough to
matter.
So if we are not careful, we can take this
mental habit of challenging assumptions and
carry it to the point where it does us great
harm. If you will bear with me for a minute, I want to put this habit of challenging
assumptions—often born in law school—in
a very simplified context.
The broad trend of political philosophy,
at least since the early modern philosophers,
has been to re-examine the legitimacy of the
state and its coercive power through binding
law. I suppose this is simply part of the eternal quest of philosophy to wonder about the
nature of things, to ask, for example, how
we can even know if we exist.
I have the greatest respect for notable
philosophers who have struggled with these
difficult questions. The problem, as I see it,
is that most of us only get a passing introduction to the philosophical method. They stare
into the abyss; we blithely jump over a ravine.
That’s just part of the overall schizophrenia
of the law, which is really two things operating simultaneously. On one hand, at the
level of abstraction, the law is an idea and is
bound up in the whole question of who we
are, what is society, and how, if ever, the law
acquires coercive power. It is an offshoot of
philosophy and is concerned with deeply
serious and difficult questions about the
nature of law and the state.

But at another level, law is an exercise
in pragmatism, a glorified trade that for its
operation depends on a host of assumptions
that keep the day-to-day machinery of the
law moving. I don’t mean this pejoratively. I
loved practicing law, and it’s a great way to
do a lot of good. But at the level of implementation and action, most lawyers are not very
concerned with questions about whether we
can even know what constitutes an external
world. As the authors of Plato and a Platypus
Walk into a Bar put it, “These are questions
that are better examined over coffee and cigarettes in a small Parisian cafe than over an
assembly line in Detroit,” or for that matter, a
box of documents in an associate’s office.
We see these two types coexist in the
legal world even today: the abstract legal
theorist, usually a law professor, who understands law as a branch of political philosophy
and the no-nonsense lawyer entirely occupied
with the work of individual clients and cases.
Sometimes, as in Abraham Lincoln, we get
both types in one lawyer. But not often.
Most of you, I suspect, will be wholeheartedly engaged in the business of law. But
the philosophical tradition of questioning
assumptions that you were mildly infected
with in law school can still affect you in
unhelpful ways. First, because you were
introduced to skepticism but never really
came to grips with it, you may become leery
of declaratory statements. You have this illdefined notion that it’s hard to know anything, or maybe just dangerous to make any
claim to knowledge, so you constantly hedge
your bets. This hedging is different than the
spirit of liberty that Judge Hand described.
Instead of care or even caution, it is cowardice. It seems premised on the idea that the
law is built entirely on shifting sands, with
no solid foundation, and the best a poor
lawyer can do is avoid getting trapped in a
categorical statement. I’m sure that for the
new law student, or for the sloppy one, the
central lesson of law school may seem to be
that there are no rules and no right answers.
But that’s stopping too soon, without paying the price for discerning the underlying
solidity of law. The disillusionment of 1ls
is supposed to “dis” only the “illusions,” not
the whole. Professor Karl N. Llewellyn used
a nursery rhyme to teach the process of first
getting blinded by the law and then seeing
again more clearly:

There was a man in our town
And he was wondrous wise:
He jumped into a bramble bush
And scratched out both his eyes—
And when he saw that he was blind,
With all his might and main
He jumped into another one
And scratched them in again.
[The Bramble Bush: On Our Law and Its Study
(New York: Oceana Publications, 1951), 4]

Llewellyn’s main point is one that some
of you need to hear: just being blinded by
the law, that is, abandoning all your prelaw
assumptions and being willing to question
the truth and reality of everything, is only
half the journey. The rest of the journey is
to carefully figure out what is real, true, stable, and reliable. You won’t learn this in law
school. But you can learn it on your own
through the dint of hard work. And even setting aside for a moment your access to revelation as a source of truth, you can, as lawyers,

still come to know things to be true. The law
was once populated with a host of seriousminded lawyers who understood this and
struggled with it—now, not so much.
My challenge to you is to do one of two
things: either recognize that this whole philosophical skepticism enterprise is just not
your thing, back out of the bramble bush,
and have at it in the business of the law; or
finish the journey. Study, think hard, and
rediscover a solid foundation for the law. It
is the work of a lifetime.

Either recognize
that this whole
philosophical
skepticism enterprise is just not
your thing, back
out of the bramble
bush, and have at
it in the business
of the law; or finish the journey.
Study, think hard, and rediscover
a solid foundation for the law.
It is the work of
a lifetime.
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neutral rules:

i r r e l e va n c i e s —

a b r i d g e t o o fa r

but whose?

The second trait
I mentioned earlier
was eliminating irrelevancies. It, too, has its dark side. We can
mistakenly assume that analytic purity—
and by that I mean focusing only on facts or
statements that tend to prove the proposition—is the best, or even the only, path to
truth. In doing so, we can end up discarding
other, equally valuable ways of figuring out
what is real, or true, or correct.
For example, sometimes we focus on
what a person is saying, testing it for its
internal coherence, but don’t focus enough
on who the speaker is. This was driven
home to me in an experience I had during
a summer clerkship. My firm was representing a bank whose customers had been swept
up in a sprawling real estate scam. During
the summer, I helped interview six or seven
of those couples, who had lost everything.
The scam involved the developer visiting
people in their homes, trying to get them to
take out a second mortgage and invest the
money with him. He had the 1980s equivalent of a PowerPoint presentation, and it
was a beauty. All the numbers added up to
support his promise of great returns, and it
was backed up by high-profile endorsements
and proven past performance. Of course, it
was all a lie. After his show he’d gather up
his materials and leave.
Then the husband and wife would be
alone. Six or seven times, I heard a tearful
man who’d lost his life savings say something like this:
I told her I thought it was a great opportunity, and we should do it. She seemed very reluctant. I asked why, and she couldn’t really give me
a reason. She just said there was something about
the guy that she didn’t trust. I told her that wasn’t
really a valid reason, and so we went ahead. Boy,
do I wish I had listened.
I hope the point of this story is clear.
Malcolm Gladwell, in his book Blink, makes
the same point. There are ways of knowing
that can’t be reduced to a structured argument. You ignore them at your peril.
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The last trait I mentioned earlier was following neutral rules. I
have tried to point out
that following the same
rules the same way for everybody is part
of the genius of Western law. Now I’d like
to look at the downside of rulemaking.
For over a century, law has had an identity
crisis about the certainty and neutrality
of the rules of law. It started with the socalled “realism” of Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes. In 1881, while still a law professor at Harvard, he suggested that the law
was not, after all, neutral or certain but
depended on the life experiences, views,
and personal prejudices of judges and juries.
“General propositions do not decide concrete cases,” he said, and more famously,
“The life of the law has not been logic: it
has been experience.” The more provocative description of this new realism was by
Professor Robert Hutchins: “What a judge
has for breakfast is more important than
any principle of law.”
The law—and lawyers—were both horrified and fascinated by this new way of
seeing things. To say there was an overreaction is an understatement. To summarize a
century of development: we took refuge in
written rules. We decided that to avoid the
idiosyncrasy and partiality of the broad but
neutral rules, we would just have a written
regulation that would clearly cover everything and be basically self-executing. The
law has generally turned away from heuristic answers and now seeks algorithms. I
hope you will agree with me that the idea
that enough regulations can be written
clearly enough so that the answer to every
legal question is clear and requires no judgment or debate has been a complete and
total disaster.
If I can make up my own distinction
here: I believe in neutral, predictable rules
that apply evenly to everyone but that are
written at some level of generality. But I
don’t believe in regulations that cover every
aspect of life. Even if the enterprise were possible, it would vastly reduce liberty. And as
Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo recognized,
the whole idea is a mistake:

No doubt the ideal system, if it were attainable,
would be a code at once so flexible and so minute,
as to supply in advance for every conceivable situation the just and fitting rule. But life is too complex
to bring the attainment of this ideal within the compass of human powers. [The Nature of the Judicial
Process (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1921), 143]
I don’t mean to suggest that we dispense
with all regulation. The certainty and clarity
that some degree of regulation provides is
essential to taking action. Before I go to the
airport, for example, I don’t want to guess
what I can take on the plane. But I think they
can go ahead and quit explaining to me how
to buckle a seat belt.
We’ve all experienced the same thing—
some rigid bureaucrat applying a senseless
regulation in ways that do some harm and no
good.
So I commended to you the beauty of
neutral rules. But I hope you will think about
the pervasive harm and lost liberty that can
come from overregulation.
t h i n k i n g l i k e a l aw y e r :
how to lose friends and
a l i e n at e p e o p l e

So far I’ve looked at the
strengths and weaknesses of three traits of
thinking like a lawyer. Now I want to
step back and look
at the phenomenon of thinking like a lawyer
in terms of how it can ruin your life.
Rigorously analytical thinking is only
a tool—and just one tool among many—
for arriving at the truth. I should point out
that being analytical has, in my experience,
served the purposes of liars and self-deceivers
almost as often as it has aided truth seekers.
Please listen carefully, for we have come to
the place in my remarks that represents the
entire reason I have driven to Eugene. Your
friends and families want you to hear this.
Being illogical is not necessarily the same
thing as being wrong. Or, to be more precise
about it, stating your position or views in an
illogical way is not the same thing as being
wrong. I hope you caught the difference.
Your friends and family know this, and they

get mad when you act like your orderly statement of your position, coupled with your
rhetorical skills, makes you right.
You make this worse when you use a
calm, rational demeanor and tone of voice
as a weapon. Many of you have done this
already. You have two false assumptions:
first, that the person who speaks more analytically is right, and second, that the person who speaks slowly and calmly is right.
So, when you are arguing with a loved
one or friend and you use calm speech as a
weapon, knowing it will prod him or her to
even greater emotionality, you have done
doubly wrong.
Particularly in a family setting, there is
another, perhaps more fundamental problem: you can actually be right and still be
dead wrong. For example, if I have a discussion with my younger children, perhaps
they will stake out some position that is,
in fact, patently silly, readily demonstrable as untrue and unwise. I might quickly
show that in ways that are, for the sake of
argument today, objectively irrefutable.
Yet every word I speak in so doing will be
deeply wrong.
Why? Because in the name of getting
the right answer on this issue, I am destroying the fragile bridge between me and her.
Please work hard never to hear the words I
have heard: “I can’t talk to you about things,
Dad, because I just feel trapped by your
arguments.”
I mentioned earlier that one of the
things we do is to note irrelevancies in the
speech of others. My advice is: Don’t. Hear
what is being said. Better yet, hear what is
meant by what is said. I’ve heard lawyers in
personal arguments say, “I’m just going by
what you said,” as if that answered everything. In a deposition, it might. But in life,
go by what is meant in the context of who
they are. Learn to hear in more than one language, more than just the language of law.
Initially, you may have to translate, but try
to learn to seamlessly see the world through
more than just the prism of the law. Right
now you are immersed in the law. But soon,
if you want to be happy, you must come
up for air.
This is really just about being humble. Trust me, most of us have a lot to be
humble about. Ask yourself: Do lawyers
generally live better lives than other people?

Are they happier? More successful? Better
parents or spouses? Better lovers? Are they
even better politicians and legislators? The
answer to each question is, of course, no.
So maybe, just maybe, you still have a lot
to learn from those around you, and you
should pay attention.

fa i t h

Finally, thinking like a lawyer can get in the
way of living with faith. By that I mean faith
with both a small and a capital F. I don’t
mean to suggest that faith and reason are
antithetical to each other. I see them as Venn
diagrams, with substantial overlap. But most
of the important endeavors in life require
faith to act.

A solitude ten thousand fathoms deep
Sustains the bed on which we lie, my dear:
Although I love you, you will have to leap;
Our dream of safety has to disappear.
[W. H. Auden, “Leap Before You Look”]
3. Faith in God. My own view is that God
is not illogical; in fact, He is the Author of
logic. But He is possessed of vastly more
truth and knowledge than we are. So He
speaks in what seem like mortal ironies: Cast
your bread upon the water, and it shall return
to you; he that will lose his life shall find it;
he that is greatest let him be the servant of
all; if ye have done it unto the least of these,
ye have done it unto me. Well, thinking like a
lawyer simply won’t bring you the happiness
and light found in these truths. But trust will.
Faith will. A suspension of skepticism will.
Still, this sort of faith and reason can
coexist. I have always taken heart from the
version of the Golden Rule found in Luke
10:25–28 (see also Mark 12:32):

1. Faith to act. Let’s start with the business
world. The most common complaint people
in business have about lawyers is that they
gum up deals and get in the way of making
things happen. There is an element of risk,
of the unknown, in most transactions, and
many lawyers can’t seem to get over that.
They obsess over what might go wrong or
what cannot be known. Most ceos have to
learn, at some level, to ignore their own lawyers in order to succeed.
2. Faith in personal relationships. Of course,
the same risk and uncertainty that exists in
the business world exists to an even greater
degree in personal relationships. The foundation of every romance, every deep friendship,
every family, is trust, faith, and perhaps a little fear, but not logic, not counting the cost,
not rigorous analysis.

And, behold, a certain lawyer stood up, and
tempted him, saying, Master, what shall I do to
inherit eternal life?
He said unto him, What is written in the law?
how readest thou?
And he answering said, Thou shalt love the
Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy
soul, and with all thy strength, and with all thy
mind; and thy neighbour as thyself.
And he said unto him, Thou hast answered
right: this do, and thou shalt live.

The sense of danger must not disappear:
The way is certainly both short and steep,
However gradual it looks from here;
Look if you like, but you will have to leap.
.......................
The worried efforts of the busy heap,
The dirt, the imprecision, and the beer
Produce a few smart wisecracks every year;
Laugh if you can, but you will have to leap.
.......................

My assurance, my message to you is that
if you will treat thinking like a lawyer as a
brilliant and effective tool, but only a tool,
with limits on its usefulness, and stay open
to other tools for living your life, then your
life as a lawyer—no, as a person with a law
degree—can be satisfying and whole.

As far as I know, this is the closest any
lawyer has ever gotten to actually being
praised by any major religious figure. But
what he had done was worth praising: he had
glimpsed the synthesis of the law and life.
conclusion

*Michael W. Mossman, ’84, is a u.s. District Court
Judge, District of Oregon.
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I

most decidedly do not want
to sound like an ad campaign, however “We’ve come a long way, baby!”
is about the best way I can think of to describe our current state of affairs
when it comes to women in the law. The expression comes from the
1960s ad campaign for cigarettes designed for women, with the idea at
the time being that women had progressed so much in society that they
now had cigarettes designed just for them. Of course, there are a number
of ironies in the ad, the most obvious one being that by calling women
“baby,” the campaign demonstrated just how far women still had to
go. In much the same way, women in the law have indeed come a long
way, but we see all around us examples of just how far we have left to go.

illustrations by marcos chin

The following article is adapted from a talk given to the Orange County Chapter of J. Reuben Clark Law Society on April 8, 2011.
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I

will share with you some

of my thoughts about gender bias in the law, including examples of women who inspire
me, anecdotes from my own legal career, obstacles I have faced along the way, and some
thoughts about checking our own biases. I will leave with you the hope that I have for
my own daughters, granddaughters, sons, and (one day) grandsons. We still have a
long way to go, but I am indeed hopeful as I look forward and see us continuing toward
the goals of equity feminism: fairness, equality, and access for all, regardless of gender.
I’ll start by giving two examples of tremendous women in the law who inspire me.
Tani Cantil-Sakauye, our new chief justice
of the California Supreme Court, is only
the second female to hold this critical post
within our legal system and the first AsianFilipina American to do so. She is amazing,
intelligent, fair, and strong. She is 51 years
old, a mother of two teenage daughters, and
someone I know and admire greatly.
In my own appellate district, my dear
friend Carol Codrington was just appointed
this past January. She is the first AfricanAmerican to be appointed to our appellate district, and she is currently the only
African-American woman on the court of
appeals statewide. She is a dear friend, and
I was privileged to speak at her confirmation hearing held at the Supreme Court of
California in San Francisco before then chief
justice Ronald George, then attorney general
(now governor) Jerry Brown, and the others on the commission. I am proud of these
women who are amazing and strong examples to me. They are part of a long chain of
pioneers in the law that will undoubtedly
continue into the future and one day include
many who are just now entering or have yet
to enter the profession.
As for me, I am the mother of six children—four daughters and two sons—and
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the nana of three brilliant and capable
granddaughters. Much like Thumper in the
Disney classic Bambi, when it comes to my
granddaughters, I am simply “twitterpated.”
I have sentenced defendants to multiple life
sentences. I have presided over more than
30 horrific child molestation cases as well
as many murder, attempted murder, sexual
assault, gang, and domestic violence cases.
I serve on committees, task forces, and
judicial faculties at the county, state, and
national levels. I am logical, forward thinking, in charge, and a bottom-line sort of
person; but when it comes to my granddaughters, I am indeed twitterpated. Putty
in their hands. I tried to get them to call me
“Judge,” but they refused. Nana—of all the
ridiculous things to be called—Nana.
I converted to the lds Church when I
was 12 years old. A precocious child, when
the missionaries knocked on my door, I read
the entire Book of Mormon and decided to
get baptized. My single mother and my two
younger sisters joined some six years later.
I am on my fourth tour of duty as Young
Women president and have been honored to
serve as Relief Society president as well. I am
a card-carrying, temple-going, active member of the lds Church, and I am the presiding judge of one of the largest counties in
the country—2.2 million people and 7,200
square miles.
Before becoming a judge, though, I was
a commissioner. Before becoming a commissioner, I had my own law firm—a very
successful firm, I might add. I represented
regional banks, a large agricultural conglomerate, a car racing group, and many
others, doing mostly business and real estate
litigation. When I decided that I wanted to
eventually become a bench officer, I devoted
a portion of my practice to criminal defense

through the county conflicts defense panel.
As you can imagine, all of this went over well
with some of the Relief Society women who
knew better than me what was best for my
family and my community.
As a female lds attorney, you feel the
sting of gender bias both in the professional
world in which we circulate and, unfortunately and more disappointingly, in the
communities and cultures of our wards and
stakes. I wish I could shift this over to the
men, but I must say for the most part in my
experience within the Church, it has been
the women more than the men who have
shown strong bias concerning the working
woman. It seems that unless you are in the
fields of education, nursing, or retail, you
often become isolated as a result of strongly
held preferences and biases by some of our
sisters. An insightful bishop took care of
that and made me Relief Society president.
So on Sundays I made home visits, and on
many a Monday I made jail visits.
Believe it or not, they were very much
the same. I found that when people are in
crisis, when people are hurting, they all need
respect and compassion. Whether it is the
single mother at church with tattoos and
piercings who has lost her job and needs a
food order or the young man caught up in
the courts who has lost his way to drugs,
they both need to be treated with dignity,
even if that dignity results in consequences
for their choices. When sentencing the cruelest of criminals, I try to do so with decorum,
never demeaning or losing sight of the integrity of the office I hold so dear.
As a litigator, I had many experiences
that I’m sure countless others have had: I
was often mistaken for the court reporter
or clerk, called “Miss” instead of “Ms.,” or,
worse yet, “hun” or “young lady.” These seem
like small things, but the cumulative effect
is annoying, to say the least, and serves as
one more distraction in a high-stress situation. It also does something strange to
women. Rather than command respect
based on our performance and our gender,
we do odd things in response, like lower our
voices when speaking in court, talking in our
female version of a manly man voice. Why
do some women lawyers do that with their
voices, anyway? I think it confuses juries,
and I know it confuses me. It is rather odd,
but we do it. More significantly, we often

respond by behaving less zealously as advocates and by acting in ways that are more
dramatic and antic-driven in an attempt to
compensate for gender bias.
I decided rather early on that I would
engender my gender. I brought a portable
crib to my office and hired my mother as an
office manager and nanny. The clients loved
it, and I was able to keep my youngest at the
office until I felt he was old enough to be
in part-time day care. I would not become
one of the boys, and I would not abandon
the parts of womanhood that I enjoyed.
My successes with juries would come from
accentuating exactly who I was, without
pretense. I was prepared, well spoken, and
at ease. I wanted juries to see me as a woman,
a mom, a sister, an aunt, and a daughter,
because that is who I am. It did not require
me to transgender my patterns of speech, my
appearance, or my behavior. I did not have
to be base or crude in order to be accepted.
Indeed, I think that being a strong, compassionate, intelligent woman is why I was so
successful. Respect is garnered when respect
is given without falsehood.
Shortly after I began practicing law,
an opportunity arose for me to take over a
practice from an attorney who had practiced
for years. He became a judge, and it was up
to me to keep those longtime, important
clients. The attorney’s parting words to me
were, “Don’t blow it, young woman.” His
biggest client was a very successful agricultural business. These were farmers, men,
manly men, men who ran a huge multimillion dollar operation, and men who were
wealthy and powerful enough that they were
not used to being told no.
I will never forget walking into the office
of the ceo and owner of that business as a
very young, female attorney, knowing that I
was going to have to tell this gruff, grouchy,
and powerful man something he did not
want to hear. I was sick. I knew that this was
make-or-break time. Keeping my integrity
by giving my honest advice was, of course,
most important, but I was well aware that
if this business was pulled from me, my firm
would go under. Before I went into that
office, I did indeed feel like a little girl.
I took a big breath, stood firm, and presented my advice, knowing it was contrary
to what the farmer wanted. He listened,
never interrupting me, and then sat glar-

ing at me. Finally, he spoke: “Well, Sherrill,
guess you’ll be our lawyer. Guess we will follow your advice.” He shook my hand and
became one of my best clients. He owned
a top-notch stock car and funny car racing business and hired me on to handle
that business as well. Many an afternoon,
I in my six-inch stilettos was in that garage,
hanging with the guys and going over the
contracts, signing them on the hood of a
race car. They would hustle to flip over their
pin-up calendars as a sign of respect, and I
am certain their language was cleaned up as
well. I retained and expanded their business
because I was an excellent attorney who
would not compromise her integrity or her
gender. We are friends to this day.
In the mid-1990s, the statutory rape
laws in the state of California were genderspecific in that only men could be charged
and only females could be protected.
During that time, I had one of the most
significant opportunities of my legal career.
The football coach at a local high school
made national attention by soliciting sex
for his wife from two of his quarterbacks.
He would bring the young men, both of
whom, incidentally, were from strong and
intact religious families, into his home and
his life, making them part of the family.
Then, as part of a very perverted plan, he
strongly encouraged them to have sex with
his wife. This went on for a few years until
the story finally broke.
Even though these young men were
minors whose lives had been turned upside
down, they were not protected under the
statutory rape laws of California at the
time, because they were male and the person they were having sex with was female.
The families of the victims came to me for
help, and I took on their case, pro bono.
With the help of these brave young men,
I was able to start a grassroots campaign
and help change the statutory rape laws in
California to become gender neutral. Many
other states followed our lead, and this is
why we now see many female teachers, for
example, prosecuted for having sex with
their underage male students.
I lost a law partner as a result of that case
and became the target of extreme gender
bias, as did the young men. Jay Leno made
jokes on national television discounting the
notion that a teenage boy could be a victim.
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In court, male attorneys and judges made
crude and inappropriate remarks. Shock
jocks and others on the radio used this as
fodder, questioning my relationship with
these boys as a female attorney about the
same age as their perpetrator. Some feminists jeered me as well, go figure, claiming
that the change in the law would open up
additional ways to oppress women. It was a
difficult time, but it was a victorious time.
It was the right thing to do. We testified in
Sacramento, and the law was passed. Those
young men did something courageous as
they stepped out of the shadows, and I am
proud to have helped them.
Shortly after that, I decided to apply to
become a judge. I was a shoo-in—at least
that’s what everyone thought. I went into
my judicial nomination evaluation (jne)
interview confident and collected. Two of
my interviewers were women, so I knew
that gender bias wouldn’t be an issue, of
course, and thought to myself, “I have
this made, sisters!” At 35, I was young and
far more naïve, I suppose, than I had ever
imagined. The experience could not have
been much worse. Most jne interviews
last between 30 and 90 minutes. The first
few minutes were great as we ran through
my strengths. Then it got ugly. For the
next several hours I was grilled on being a
Mormon and, more extensively and specifically, on how I could possibly be a judge
and a mother with all those children. When
I left, I was battered and bruised and pretty
dumbfounded. It was no surprise that I
didn’t get the job. Despite my previous successes, and although I knew I was only one
of a hundred applicants, not getting the
position really made me think that I simply
might not be judge material.
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Nevertheless, I was given the opportunity to serve in a similar capacity as a commissioner. I held that post for nine years. I
loved it but knew I wanted more. Year after
year the judges, commissioners, and attorneys with whom I interacted encouraged me
to apply for a judgeship. I knew I wanted to,
but I didn’t want to go through that miserable experience again. After nine years I
finally put my name back into the hat. This
time around it was a much better experience.
My jne interview took 20 minutes, and my
evaluators told me they had not received a
single negative evaluation. A far cry from
those who had questioned me as a woman,
mother, and Mormon, the evaluators this
time around focused on attributes like fairness, integrity, and legal acumen.
Being sworn in as a superior court judge
was for me a defining moment in my life. Not
only did it give me a little taste of sweet vindication, as you can imagine, but it also allowed
me to honor my mother, my sisters, my husband, and my children. I was subsequently
elected by my peers to the office of presid-

ing judge. In its more than one hundred year
history, I was only the seventh woman ever
appointed to the Riverside County Superior
Court and only the second woman appointed
to my current position of presiding judge.
Recently, this topic of gender bias got
me searching. I felt a little bit like a kid
who is snipe hunting—looking for but
never finding the illusive snipe. In this case
I was searching for a female lds judge in
California other than myself. I called the
Church offices, which sent me to the statistics department, which sent me to the legal
department, which sent me to a real law
firm with a name like McConkie in it. That
resulted in someone doing some research
and calling back with the simple answer “We
don’t know the answer.” I called all of my
male lds judges from the trial court to the
court of appeals, up and down the state. The
universal conclusion was “Never heard of
one; don’t think they exist.”
So I would love to be corrected, but
I think I am on fairly good, elevated burden of proof standards when I say that I

think I am the only female lds judge in
the state of California. I am certain that
I am the only female lds presiding judge
in the state of California. It is a little startling, isn’t it? If anyone knows of other
California snipes such as me, I welcome
your e-mails of correction.
As women, we need to do all we can
to combat bias in appropriate ways. When
my youngest was in his senior year of high
school, he lettered in three sports. I was in
a plum assignment presiding over felony
trials with the most experienced lawyers,
the most interesting cases, and a beautiful
top-floor office at one of the newer courthouses. But I had a 45-minute commute
that precluded me from watching him play
baseball. As a mom, I wanted to be there;
as a judge who did not want to look weak,
I was torn. In the end, I traded in the plum
for a difficult domestic violence family law
assignment in order to be closer to home
and able to attend his games. I am a mom
who happens to be a judge, and compromising my priorities would have been a
compromise of who I am. I gained the
respect of both men and women on the
bench because my family came first. We
as women often tend to be our own worst
enemies; we like to blame the guys, but we
are frequently just as culpable, if not worse.
Women, figure out what your priorities are,
and do not compromise or yield to bias or
pressure. You will be less stressed, and you
will find that those who are important to
you will respect your decisions.
To the wonderful men who support
the women in their lives, as my husband
and sons have supported me, I thank
you. I ask you to continue to check your
biases and consider how you deal with the
women in your life. I hope you encourage
your daughters to be what I refer to in my
Young Women organization as “ultimate
women.” Ultimate women are those who
rely on their inner beauty, who are intelligent, who are strong, and who are courageous. I love that my niece, the same niece
who was a beauty pageant finalist, a vocalist, and a viola player, graduated from byu
with an advanced degree in mathematics
despite being told “girls don’t like math”
over and over by her peers, teachers, and
leaders. She is a great example to me of
an ultimate woman. Encourage the women

in your lives to continue to learn, to serve,
and to define themselves.
So what hope do we have for the future?
I am very hopeful. There are 58 presiding
judges in California. It is truly the highest
honor that can be bestowed on trial court
judges to be asked by their peers to lead and
represent them. Of the 58 presiding judges,
we have, I believe, a record 13 female presiding judges, and Los Angeles has its first-ever
female presiding judge. I see more female
attorneys in court all the time and wide-scale
acceptance of attorneys on their merits, not
their gender.
Over the past 15 years in my combined
time as a commissioner and a judge, I have
had many amazing experiences and significant accomplishments. I believe my success
is in some ways a direct reflection of the
obstacles I overcame as a woman—an lds
woman—along the way. Perhaps I committed a little bit more as I felt the need
to overcome the bias—being considered
a young lady instead of a lawyer, a court
reporter instead of a litigator, or a soccer
mom only instead of a judicial candidate.
Despite the frustrations and the obstacles
along the way, I have often thought, “Who
better than me, a mother of six, to sort out
the complex issues of high-conflict custody battles? Who better than me, an lds
woman, to preside over child molestation
cases where the victims and the juries need
a gentle touch? Who better than me to handle domestic violence cases?”
I am confident that we will one day see
true fairness, equality, and access for all,
regardless of gender. To get there, though,
each of us needs to step up and ask, “Who
better than me?” I am convinced that the
best ways to combat the biases we face are
to perform to the best of our abilities, to
be committed to excellence in all aspects of
our profession, and to embrace the gospel
in a way that never leaves others to question our standards. Although we see less
bias today than in decades past, I am confident that we will only continue to progress.
One day we will look back on our present
times and the progress we will have made
from now, thinking to ourselves, “We’ve
come a long way, baby.”

I am confident
that we will one
day see true fairness, equality,
and access for all,
regardless of gender. To get there,
though, each of us
needs to step up
and ask, “Who better than me?”

*Sherrill Anne Ellsworth is presiding judge, Riverside
County Superior Court.
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udges considering the “danger” posed by a defendant in pretrial release is a relatively
new phenomenon. Historically, most defendants were guaranteed release on bail before
trial.1 The major factor to determine pretrial release used to be whether a defendant posed
a flight risk. However, after the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984, judges were charged with
determining which defendants were “dangerous” or posed a threat to public safety, allowing judges to hold particular defendants in jail pretrial. Across the nation judges began predicting which defendants would be likely to commit a violent crime. Much debate ensued
on whether that determination was appropriate, as well as which factors should be taken
into consideration. However, the debate died more than 20 years ago, and there has been
little dialogue since on how pretrial detention is going for America. Today, politicians are
searching for a solution to the rising costs of incarceration in tough economic times; however, pretrial detention’s impact on high incarceration rates has yet to enter the discussion.2
Our analysis of a nationally representative
15-year dataset of over 100,000 defendants and most states followed suit.7 In 1944, Rule 46 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
shows that the United States could signifi- allowed courts to consider several factors in setting bail, including “the nature and circumcantly reduce the amount of people held in stances of the offense charged, the weight of the evidence against him, the financial ability of
jail pretrial. These data show that currently the defendant to give bail and the character of the defendant.”8 While it did not consider whether
judges often detain the wrong people. We the defendant posed a threat while released, the ability of judges to consider the “character of
also demonstrate that up to 25 percent more the defendant” provided an opening to evaluate a defendant’s dangerousness.
defendants could be released pretrial without
As time went on, bail reform continued to expand upon the reasoning for which
an increase in pretrial crime. As many coun- defendants could be detained pretrial. The 1966 Bail Reform Act focused on a defendant’s
ties in the United States spend more money appearance in court, permitting judges to consider a defendant’s prior record9 and thus
on jails than on schools,3 changes to pretrial opening the door for judges to consider additional factors besides flight risk.10 Under the
detention could have sweeping public policy District of Columbia Crime Bill of 1970,11 judges, for the first time in u.s. history, could
effects, especially since the majority of people detain a defendant pretrial, without setting any bail, if the defendant was deemed dangerin u.s. jails are pretrial defendants.4 If pretrial ous to society.12
detention can be reduced and more defenTaking a cue from the d.c. Crime Bill and a greater public fear of crime, the Federal Bail
dants can be safely released without increas- Reform Act of 198413 took a leap towards preventative detention, focusing on protecting the
ing crime, more defendants would have public from danger.14 The act was soon challenged in court, but it withstood constitutional
access to pretrial liberty and due process, challenges of vagueness, violation of right to bail, presumption of innocence, due process,
counties would save substantial amounts and excessive bail.15
of money on corrections that could be put
Before the Bail Reform Act of 1984, various states had passed legislation allowing judges
toward other important social goals, and the to consider in making bail determinations the danger that defendants posed to the commupublic would continue to feel safe at home.
nity.16 Some state laws generally listed criteria to consider when making bail decisions (such
as community ties, employment status, financial resources, drug addictions, etc.); however,
History of American Pretrial Prediction
judges were free to ignore these criteria and focus solely on the criminal charge and the prior
criminal record of the defendant.17 Because dangerousness was not clearly defined, there were
Under the common law, due process no “precise legal standards” that judges were required to follow, and determining dangerousand the presumption of innocence guaran- ness varied greatly by state.18
teed defendants the right to bail before trial.5
Often, state courts evaluate three main categories to determine dangerousness: (1) the presu.s. federal law required bail to be presumed ent offense charged, (2) past conduct, and (3) judicial discretion of the accused’s circumstances
for everyone but murder defendants (where and character. To objectively determine dangerousness, the present offense charged often trigsignificant proof of the alleged crime was gers dangerousness assessments based upon the nature of the crime. Many states review the
present).6 Until 1944, federal law guaran- defendant’s criminal record and record of appearances to evaluate dangerousness. The most subteed bail for all noncapital federal offenses, jective factor that courts consider when determining dangerousness is the defendant’s character.
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This could include (1) the accused’s family situation, (2) employment, (3) finances, (4) character and reputation, (5) record of appearances
or history of flight, (6) community ties,19 (7)
alien status,20 (8) gang involvement,21 (9) possession or control of weapons,22 (10) propensity for violence,23 (11) general attitude and
demeanor,24 (12) history of depression,25 (13)
treatment of animals,26 and (14) “any other
factor” relevant to making a determination of
dangerousness.27 A defendant found to pose
a danger to the public will either be detained
pretrial or released subject to restrictive conditions that are the “least restrictive” conditions
to ensure the defendant’s appearance and protect the community.28
Past Studies on Predictions of Violence

A number of studies have been performed
over the last 50 years in order to examine various bail systems, pretrial detention, and prediction of pretrial crime. While informative,
many are limited in scope and outdated.
Foote’s Philadelphia Bail Study in 1954
found that judges based pretrial detention
on the charge because it was an easy standard to apply,29 despite the fact that those
with lesser offenses were less likely to appear
in court than defendants with more serious
criminal charges.30
The National Bureau of Standards Study
in 1969 found that the instances of criminal defendants committing serious felonies
pretrial were low, contradicting claims by
advocates of preventive detention.31 The
study concluded that there was no statistical relationship between the first arrest type
of crime and the second arrest crime. It also
asserted that none of the 10 characteristics
used in the District of Columbia’s Bill were
accurate predictors.32
A 1970 Los Angeles study concluded that
defendants are rarely arrested for new crimes
on pretrial release.33 This study agreed with
the nbs study, concluding that those released
pretrial are not very likely to be rearrested.
A Harvard study conducted in 1970
confirmed the nbs study’s findings on pretrial detention,34 concluding that the initial
charge is a poor indicator of recidivism.35
The study determined that juvenile arrests,
previous incarceration, conviction of violent
or dangerous crimes within the past 10 years,
and convictions of four or more misdemean-

ors were better predictors. However, problems with its sample size limit the study’s
informative value.36
Goldkamp’s Philadelphia Bail Study in
the late 1970s found that detained pretrial
defendants were much more likely to be incarcerated after conviction or pleading guilty
than those who were released pretrial.37
Studies in the 1980s indicated that most
defendants appeared at trial. However, rearrest rates were quite high, between 10 and 20
percent, thus failing to convince policy makers to reduce pretrial detention.38
Since the 1980s, few studies regarding pretrial detention have been done. A
study conducted in New York, where dangerousness cannot be a determinant factor of preventive detention, showed that
few defendants were rearrested for violent
crimes while on pretrial release.39 The study
determined that residing at a New York
City address, having a residential telephone,
being employed, being in school, or participating in a training program full-time were
all factors that related significantly to a low
risk of pretrial misconduct.40
These studies illustrate the difficulty
of accurately predicting pretrial crime.
Scholars disagree as to (1) whether judges
should rely on the initial charge to set bail,41,
42 (2) what the crime rate is for defendants
released pretrial,43, 44 and (3) whether past
criminal behavior is an accurate predictor
of future criminal conduct.45, 46 Some have
said that a previous failure to appear has an
indication on future failures to appear or an
impact on predicting future crimes.47 Also,
as far as age and gender, all of those who
have commented on this have noted that
younger male defendants are more likely
to commit pretrial crime than older female
defendants.48 Finally, many scholars have
lamented that determinations of bail and
predictors of pretrial crime can never be
effective or accurate.49

many counties
i n t h e U n i t e d S tat e s
spend more money on

jails
than on schools

Pretrial Crime Dataset

Our national dataset is based on a nationally representative sample covering the 75 largest
counties in the United States. The data are drawn from the Bureau of Justice’s State Court
Processing Statistics from 1990 to 2006 and include over 116,000 observations.50 Each observation records what happens to a given felony defendant from the time of their arrest through
their trial. The data contain information on the initial crime committed, any subsequent bail
crime, the defendant’s prior record, any failures to appear, and demographic characteristics
such as age, gender, and race.
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Over the last two decades,
local jails have
housed more pretrial

Our dataset allows us to overcome two types of selectivity bias inherent to pretrial risk
assessment. First, because the sample size is large and many jurisdictions use different determinations for detaining or releasing defendants, we can predict how dangerousness differs
between those commonly—but not always—held and those commonly released. Second,
many defendants are released based upon a number of conditions that may make them less
likely to commit crime. However, knowing a defendant’s crime risk under no restrictions is
not pertinent if the most common way defendants are released is with restrictions.51
Overall, there is a relatively low level of arrests pretrial. Of all of the defendants released,
only 16 percent of them are rearrested for any reason, while 11 percent are rearrested for a felony and 1.9 percent are rearrested for a violent felony.
In 43 states judges consider the defendant’s present charge in determining release.52 Prior
studies have found that judges often rely on the initial charge to set bail,53 though some studies have concluded that the crime charged is unrelated to the crime the defendant is rearrested
for on release.54 Our large sample allows us to draw a much cleaner inference than found in
previous studies.
While the Harvard study and others claimed that there was little information in the initial charge, this turns out to be untrue. For example, those with an initial murder charge are
more than 20 times more likely to be rearrested on a violent felony charge than a defendant
charged with fraud (0.3 percent v. 6.4 percent) and about six times more likely than someone
arrested on a drug possession charge (1.1 percent v. 6.4 percent).
Defendants charged with violent crimes are not necessarily more
likely to be rearrested pretrial. The defendants with the highest rearrest
rates pretrial (21 percent) are those charged with drug sales and robbery.
Those released who are charged with the more “dangerous crimes,” such as murder, rape,
and felony assault, have much lower overall rates of pretrial rearrest at 12 percent, 9 percent,
and 12 percent. However, those originally charged with violent crimes are much more likely
to be rearrested pretrial for violent crimes, showing that the initial charge is linked with the
type of crimes committed pretrial.
While there is a large range of “dangerousness” pretrial, those released pretrial are perhaps
much less dangerous than most people would anticipate. For almost all crimes,55 defendants
are only about 1–2 percent likely to be arrested for a violent crime pretrial.
Thirty-three states and the District of Columbia conduct some review of the defendant’s prior convictions as a factor in pretrial release. However, prior work has disagreed as
to whether past conduct56 or previous convictions are accurate predictors of future criminal
conduct.57 This more extensive dataset analysis indicates that past crime is a key predictor of
future crime. Though there is a correlation between prior convictions and rearrest, the data
show that defendants with four or more prior convictions are not rearrested much more than
defendants with no or just one prior conviction. Repeat offenders, those with four prior convictions, are still only committing pretrial violent crime in about one in 30 instances. A person
with prior convictions appears to be more dangerous than a person with prior arrests, yet both
categories of defendants are more likely to commit violent crimes pretrial.
Age is also a strong predictor of future arrests. The older the defendant, the less likely
the defendant will be rearrested. Teenagers are four times more likely to be rearrested than a
defendant over the age of 50. Along with age, both prior record and initial charge make substantial differences in the probability of rearrest. On the other hand, prior failures to appear
are not significant predictors of future violent behavior.
Judges detain defendants pretrial not only on the basis of dangerousness but also on flight
risk. Flight risk varies somewhat with age, but the difference is not as pronounced as it was for
violence risk. A prior failure to appear more than doubles the chance of flight. This is significant
because historically courts looked primarily at flight risk to determine whether to release an individual on bail. Initial offense is also a strong predictor, but in a very different pattern compared to
violent crime. For violent crime, an initial violent crime charge indicated the highest chances of
rearrest for violence; but for flight risk, those most likely to flee are those accused of drug crimes.
In general, the factors that a judge can easily observe about a defendant that make him
more likely to flee are almost completely uncorrelated (and thus unrelated) to the factors that
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make a defendant likely to be rearrested for a violent crime. This is not to say that the
two events are entirely uncorrelated but rather that the things one can predict about
future crime are uncorrelated with the things one can predict about flight risk.
In states that consider both flight risk and dangerousness, which constitute the
majority of states, dangerousness seems to be a much larger consideration for judges.
A one-unit log increase in flight risk increases the chances of being held by about 2
percent, while a similar increase in predicted violence leads to a 10 percent increase
in likelihood of detention. Thus, potential for violence is considered almost five times
more heavily than flight risk in most states.
In the states that do not consider dangerousness or that ban preventative detention, flight risk becomes dramatically more
important. A one-unit log change in flight
risk produces an increase of 9.9 percent in
the chances of being held, while a similar
increase in predicted violence increases the
chances of being held by 8 percent. Thus,
while these states may not be following the
law perfectly, flight risk is a bigger consideration than expected danger.
Since the 1980s both federal and state
detention rates have increased. Over the last
two decades local jails have housed more
pretrial detainees than actual convicts.58
Based upon the dataset and current pretrial detention practices, judges are often
releasing and detaining the wrong groups
of people. The data suggest that about half
of those detained are less likely to commit
a violent crime pretrial than many of the
people released. The percentage of pretrial
defendants released could be increased from
its current 62 percent to 85 percent while
maintaining a crime rate of 14.7 percent,
which is lower than the current rate of 16 percent. Thus, our predicted model can provide
guidance for judges to make more efficient
decisions and increase the number of people
released pretrial without causing increased
danger to the public.
Beyond just reducing the prison population, more accurately predicting rearrest
rates would have a great impact on defendants. Often defendants who are detained
pretrial suffer prejudice, being more likely
to be convicted or plead guilty.59 Beyond
the likelihood of guilt, defendants detained
pretrial often encounter difficulty in financial and employment pursuits,60 in obtaining
private counsel,61 and in sentencing.62 In addition, increased detention increases costs for
counties, which are dealing with tight budgets.
We do not ignore that there are large costs to victims and society when more crimes are
committed. The costs of murder, rape, burglary, robbery, and other felony offenses are tremendous financially and in other intangible ways.63 The aims of detaining defendants pretrial
have evolved in order to protect society from repeating events that brought the defendants to
court in the first instance.
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Conclusion

In our society today we expect the government to provide for our safety by preventing crime and violence and often criticize the
criminal justice system and its inefficiencies.
Others tackling the pretrial crime and prediction problem have advocated speedy trials,64
an increase in pretrial supervision programs,65
bail forfeiture,66 more visibility of judicial detention decisions,67 and setting bail
amounts in a more logical way.68 While our
model is not the end-all to solving the problem, accurately predicting pretrial violent
crime contributes in several important ways.
First, this expansive dataset and study
show that pretrial crime is actually quite
unlikely. Looking specifically at some of the
most dangerous felony defendants, the data
show that only 1.9 percent are rearrested for
violent felony crime. To look at it another
way, about 80 percent of released pretrial
defendants have less than a 3 percent chance
of being arrested pretrial for a violent crime.
Overall, the average rearrest rates are only
about 1–2 percent for a violent pretrial crime.
Second, while most defendants released
pretrial do not commit violent felonies,
there are several factors that judges should
consider in order to more accurately predict
the likelihood of pretrial crime. The present
offense, prior convictions, and prior failure to appear are all important predictors
of pretrial rearrest. Regarding the present
offense charged, those charged with robbery, burglary, and motor vehicle theft are
more likely than the average defendant to be
rearrested for any crime on release. While
defendants charged with drug offenses were
thought to be dangerous, they are among
the least likely to be rearrested for a violent
crime. The data also show that prior convictions are directly correlated with future
likelihood to commit crime. Although pretrial crime is generally exaggerated, defendants with prior convictions are more likely
to commit pretrial crime—about one in 30
instances. As for failing to appear in a prior
court proceeding, it is a good predictor for
being a flight risk but not a good predictor
of pretrial violent crime. However, past failure to appear is an indicator for being rearrested for a nonviolent crime.
Third, based upon these factors, judges
often weigh the dangerousness of a defendant
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much more heavily than flight risk. However,
if the state is not permitted to consider dangerousness, flight risk is a bigger consideration.
Finally, while recognizing the overall
increase in detention rates, this study shows
that if the goal is to prevent crime, judges are
releasing and detaining the wrong groups.
About half of those detained have less chance
of being rearrested pretrial than many of the
people released. We would be able to release
25 percent more defendants while decreasing
pretrial crime levels if we released defendants
using our evidence-based model. This model
demonstrates that judges may safely release
some older defendants, people with clean
prior records, and people who commit fraud
and public order violations without increasing danger to the public.
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ancy Stevenson Van
Slooten, ’83, international chair of the
J. Reuben Clark Law Society,
never even thought about
attending law school. She was
in the byu accounting program
intent on joining the mba program after returning from her
mission. One of her accounting
professors suggested law school,
so Nancy called Reese Hansen,
then dean over admissions,
who encouraged her to apply.
He touted law school over business school: “A lawyer with an
accounting degree can do what
an mba does, but an mba can’t
do what a lawyer does.” He
also said that women should be
lawyers and doctors rather than
nurses and secretaries because
“they set the work schedules and
can earn more money with less
time away from the family.” She
was accepted to both programs
but chose law school.
Amid the stresses of her first
year she was called to be Relief
Society president in her student
ward, where she learned to balance the needs of the sisters with
her rigorous law school schedule. The blessings came after she
graduated and was hired at a Los
Angeles firm, where she took
over the retiring senior partner’s
practice on a four-year partnership track. In the first interview
Nancy stated her priorities for
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student chapters. In just six
years there were 75. Serving as
the chair-elect of the executive
committee in 2007, she became
the international chair in 2009
and will complete her term in
October 2011.
Through her work with
the student chapters, Nancy
has developed a deep love for
the students and for mentoring them. As an entering law
student Nancy had a chance
encounter with an lds attorney
on a bus in Los Angeles. He
invited her to his office and told
her some of his experiences of
negotiating the analytical and
skeptical attorney traits in his
professional life with being
teachable and open to the
Spirit. Nancy felt blessed by
that encounter and looks with
satisfaction at similar mentoring
opportunities between students
and attorney mentors affiliated
with the Law Society.
As the first female international chair of the Law Society,
Nancy is no stranger to having
to stand up to be heard. Her law
school class was composed of
only 10 percent women, and she
was the first woman partner at
her law firm. From her early years
in practice she tells this story: “I
had been appearing before the
same judge in the probate court
for many years (he was known
not to approve of women attorneys, but I knew he respected
me anyway), presenting myself
by saying, ‘Good morning, your
honor. Nancy Stevenson appearing for the petitioner.’ The first
court appearance after my marriage I presented myself by saying, ‘Good morning, your honor.
Nancy Van Slooten appearing
for the petitioner.’ The judge
stopped the court and asked,
‘Did I hear a new name? Are
congratulations in store?’ I said,
‘Yes, your honor, I recently got
married.’ He responded, ‘And

Women
Van Slooten and Downing Finish Terms

he still lets you work?’ I respectfully replied, ‘Yes, your honor,
and I still let him work.’ The
judge’s female clerk stood and
applauded.”
In reflecting on her time
as international chair, Nancy
points to important accomplishments. “We have worked to
streamline the efficiency of the
Law Society so that it is ready
for future international growth,”

she says. “We have encouraged
our members to be an influence
for good, be a part of their communities, and be leaders in their
communities. As people hear
about the Law Society, we hope
that the members will be known
as good people who stand for
good things.” Nancy doesn’t
think that describing the work
of the Law Society as “saving
souls” is a stretch. “One mission
of the Law Society is buoying
each other up spiritually—reaching out to other attorneys, connecting with them, and not just
standing by as they flounder.”
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after 25 years of service

balancing professional life with
family life. She became the only
woman and non-Catholic attorney in the firm. The firm later
allowed her to work three days
a week at the law firm and three
days a week at a cpa firm when
she decided to pursue her cpa.
In 1986 Nancy was invited
to Provo to meet with Law
School officials and other lds
attorneys about beginning a
professional organization. In
1987 the J. Reuben Clark Law
Society was formed. Nancy
joined the charter national
board of the Law Society along
with 16 others. John Welch, Sr.,
a board member and a senior
partner at Latham & Watkins in
Los Angeles, became the chair
of the Los Angeles Chapter of
the Law Society, with Nancy as
his assistant.
Nancy began volunteering in the Law Society when
she was single and practicing
law and has continued to serve
throughout her courtship and
marriage and while raising
children. She and her husband
adopted three children from
Russia, two from Ukraine,
and one from California. After
bringing the two babies home
from Russia, she resigned from
her firm partnership and began
part-time work—15 hours a week
with one day each week in the
office—fulfilling Dean Hansen’s
assertion that lawyers set their
own schedules.
Nancy was the chair of the
Los Angeles Chapter when
her family moved to Georgia.
She then became part of the
Law Society’s International
Board, where she promoted
chapter events, assisted in the
compilation of the Law Society
handbook, and helped set up
committees.
In 2001 Bill Atkin, then
international chair, asked Nancy
to set up the new international
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fter 20 years in the
workplace, Tani Pack
Downing, ’91, president of the byu Law School
Alumni Association, is surprised
when she is the only woman in
the room. It used to be the rule,
but things have changed a little.
“People sometimes did not know
I was a woman until they met
me,” she says. “I guess because of
my name.” Tani remembers an
experience from working at her
first law firm: “We had a deposition scheduled, and when the
opposing attorney, who was a
man, showed up, he asked me if
I was the court reporter. When
I told him who I was, he seemed
surprised. He had been expecting a man.”
There were only a couple of
women attorneys in the first two
firms Tani worked in. When she
began working for state govern-

by jane h. wise

ment, closer to half of the attorneys working for the legislature
were women.
This is a change from when
Tani was growing up. Her best
friend’s mother was the only
woman she was acquainted
with who worked outside the
home—as a high school teacher.
“She always had piles of books at
the side of her chair or bed,” Tani
recalls. “I was inspired by her.
Not only did I prepare myself for
a profession—going to college
like she encouraged me to do—
there are 30 books now stacked
at the side of my bed. There are
biographies, historical works,
and Church books. I want to
always be learning.”
Tani says her career path
has been nothing she could ever
have scripted. Her first job was
as an associate with Alverson,
Taylor, Mortensen & Nelson
in Las Vegas. Her husband was
a Marine, and when his next
assignment came as a posting in
Hawaii, she found a job with a
law firm in Honolulu. At the end
of her husband’s service the family moved to Utah, where Tani
was hired as an associate general
counsel to the Utah legislature.
Seven years later she began inhouse work at an up-and-coming high-tech firm, but when
the tech bubble burst, Tani was
part of the layoffs. She was subsequently hired as the general
counsel and director of appeals
for the Utah Department of
Workforce Services. After
Governor Huntsman was
elected, he appointed her as its
executive director. A few years
later the governor appointed her
to be his deputy chief of staff and

general counsel in the governor’s
office. The job demanded 60 to
70 hours per week, and she was
always on call. After Huntsman
was appointed ambassador to
China, she heard about a position for state risk manager and
asked for Governor Herbert’s
blessing to move into that position so that she could spend
more time with her family. She
has been working there since
August 2009.
Tani has been president of
the byu Law School Alumni
Association since 2010 but has
been involved almost since
graduation. When she was only
a few years out of law school
she volunteered to be class
representative, and she later
became the chair of the events
committee. In 2008 she was
elected vice president of the
Alumni Association—during a
board meeting she didn’t attend.
She learned of the appointment
when Mary Hoagland sent her a
congratulatory e-mail. She was
surprised but happy to continue
serving. Tani became presidentelect in 2009 and president in
2010. As an immediate past
president when her term ends in
fall 2011, Tani will still sit on the
Alumni Executive Committee.
As president, Tani has
focused on making connections
with alumni in each region,
and she has made it a priority
to connect alumni to the Law
School. Several initiatives have
been to use social media, to link
the alumni newsletter with the
Law School’s web page, and to
add videos to the newsletters.
She wants new graduates to feel
immediately part of the Alumni
Association and to serve on
committees and as committee
chairs, since they are the future
leaders of the organization.
In the tough job market,
Tani encourages alumni to
feed potential jobs into Career

Services for new graduate placements. She beats the bushes
for clerkships, internships, and
externships for the 2ls. “It is
important to keep the doors
open for the people coming
behind us.” In another Alumni
Association hiring initiative,
alumni throughout the country
have been asked to host Dean
James Rasband at their law
firms. His presentations focus
on the Law School and its students—their high lsat scores
and grades, where they’ve come
from, and what their plans are;
the credentials of the faculty
and the new faculty; and the
new building projects at the
Law School. Tani hosted one of
these presentations at the Utah
State Capitol, where all the state
attorneys attended. Tani says,
“It is very exciting to bring the
Law School into law firms and
offices and let others see what
is happening there. It is very
impressive.”
Unlike her earlier law
firms, Tani has always seen
women active in the Alumni
Association. Two other women,
Mitzi Collins and Wendy
Archibald, have also served as
presidents. She believes there is
great value in participation for
both men and women because
of the networking and professional associations inherent
in this service. “I have grown
close to people I didn’t know
in law school. Some of my closest friends have come through
my service to the Alumni
Association.”
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Wheels to Keep Us Moving
b y s a r a n i e l s o n, ’ 11
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D

uring the past three
years, I’ve been a quiet,
diligent student. I tried
not to bother too many people.
I didn’t speak in class unless
spoken to. So I wasn’t surprised
when I heard the rumor that I
had been chosen to speak today,
because some people at the Law
School were under the impression that I couldn’t actually talk
and saw this occasion as their
last chance to confirm it. In my
defense, I’ve spent the last three
years surrounded by 150 people
who know—full-on know—
deep down in their hearts and
spirits that they are right about
everything. And they are dying
for the chance to prove it vocally.

Those of you who have lived
with or around a law student can
attest that it’s hard to get a word
in. So, I’m honored to have this
chance to speak, and if anyone
behind me raises their hand and
wants to make a point that they
think has been overlooked, I’m
going to ignore them.
As an undergrad at byu, I
worked in this concert hall as a
stage manager. I worked events
like this one, and many times I
had to move grand pianos back
and forth across the stage during
a performance. More often than
not, after I finished my moving
and got the piano into place, I
received a modest bit of applause
from the audience. I think
people were genuinely amazed
that I didn’t push the piano right
off the edge of the stage. More
likely, they were amazed that I
was able to move it at all, being

so small and pathetic. Many
times people would make comments like, “I don’t know how
you manage to move those pianos around so easily. They’re so
heavy.” My response was always
the same: “They’re on wheels.
I mean, the pianos have nice
wheels. I’m not carrying them
on my back.”
A similar thing has often
happened over the past three
years. I tell people that I’m in
law school, and then I have to
spend some time convincing
them that I’m actually studying
to be a lawyer and not a court
reporter or a 911
dispatcher, but
•••
an actual lawyer.
This speech
But once I have
them convinced,
was given
they usually
at the J.
say, “Oh, law
Reuben
school sounds
Clark Law
so difficult. I
don’t know how
School
you do it, being
convocation
so small and
held in
pathetic.” Oh,
the de Jong
and they usually
say, “Bless your
Concert
heart,” a few
Hall at byu
times in there
on April
somewhere.
22, 2011.
In addition
to being mildly
•••
offensive, these
people are right,
and I think my classmates would
agree with me that for the past
three years we have all been struggling with something that’s too
heavy and awkward to manage
alone. But I don’t know anyone
who has done it alone. We have
had spouses, friends, children,
parents, siblings, neighbors, and
each other. In short, over the past
three years, we all have had people in our lives, wheels to keep us
moving. I think many of them
are here tonight.
So while I know that graduates often need words of hope

and praise on this big day and
that messages of repaying debts
and doing good in the world
have their place, the message I
bring to you today is one of gratitude—not just of gratitude in
today’s moment but as a continuing part of life. From this group
on stage will emerge talented,
successful, competent attorneys
working and serving in many
places and in many fields. They
will run businesses, whole states,
banks, homes, classrooms, and
much more. But if I have to give
advice today, it is this: when you
reach these heights and along the
way, don’t imagine that you did
it on your own. One of my favorite poets, Walt Whitman wrote
that pursuing self-sufficiency kills
gratitude. I think he is right.
In all your success, I hope you
can allow yourself to need
other people and acknowledge
them for what they are: the
wheels that keep you moving.
But for today, I know that
my classmates are all feeling
grateful, not just to be done
(which, rest assured, they are
feeling), but grateful for you—
you as groups and as individuals.
Now, of course it’s impossible for every graduate to get
to say what he or she is feeling
tonight, but if they could, if
given a chance, I think most
of them would have a similar
message. For instance, I asked
Autumn Begay, a woman whose
quiet strength I admire, what
she would say today. Here it is:
First and foremost, I want
to thank my wonderful husband,
Jeremy. Hun, your encouragement
and support have been steadfast.
Through all the late nights studying
and weekends consumed in school,
you were my greatest support and
strength. You carried me through the
rough spots and championed my successes. This journey has been as much
yours as it has been mine. I love you.

To my sweet little Elijah, you
were literally with me in class from
day one of your existence. Your birth
and sweet spirit have brought me perspective and joy.
Mom and Dad Smith, you have
always made me feel that I could
aspire to great heights. Thank you
for all of your love and your support.
Your encouragement throughout my
life has meant so much.
Mom and Dad Begay and all
of the Begay clan: that you are here
today means so much to me. Your
excitement for me fills my heart with
joy. Finally, my wonderful classmates, I don’t know how to express
how grateful I am to you. You
each are so amazing and inspiring.
I truly treasure your friendships.
We have come a long way together
from that first nerve-racking day
at law school. I want you to know
how much I admire and respect you.
Thank you!
I asked my friend Tyler
LaMarr (who was the first person who showed me how to
really study) what he would say
today, and, being a man of few
words, he said this:
Thank you, Mom and Dad,
for teaching me about the things
that are so much more important
than law school, and thank you,
Yumi and Naomi, who are my most
important things.
Finally, I asked Rachel
Miller, someone whose kindness
I have admired and benefited
from since our first semester.
She asked me to say this:
Mom and Dad –
I owe it all to you. I was incredibly lucky to grow up in a terrific
Idaho home where reading, thinking, and discussing was the family
evening routine. The lessons of hard
work, integrity, and faith I learned
at home have become the bedrock
of my academic success and future

aspirations. No matter what age or
degree I attain, you will always be
my loving and wise parents, whose
examples I will try to follow. Love
you, Mom and Dad. Thanks for
everything!
It would be lovely if we
could go on until each graduate
got to say to their families and
supporters what I know they’re
thinking. But some of us are
probably getting hungry and
want to move this thing along.
But while I have your attention,
I hope you will forgive me and
indulge me while I say some
thanks of my own.
When I started law
school, my husband had
recently passed away, and I
was lost. But I came here with
my son, and we started something new, something that my
husband wanted for us. My
parents gave up two years of
retirement to help me through
it. I could not have finished
one week, let alone three years,
without them or the rest of
my family. Thank you.
Those are the people that
kept me moving at home. It
took a whole other set of people
to keep me going at school. I
think this group saw, right away,
how lost and broken I was, and
they carried me. They let a tiny,
weird little widow join their
group and learn from them.
After three years I think of them
as brothers—brilliant, evil,
genius brothers, whom I don’t
want to see or talk to for at least
two weeks. Thank you.
Finally. I want to thank my
son, Luke. He has put up with a
lot in the last three years and will
likely put up with more. Luke,
you are my favorite person in the
whole world, and I’m going to
keep working to prove it to you
every day.
To my classmates, thank
you all and congratulations.
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A

n acquisitions librarian at the
Hunter Law Library for the
past 25 years, Bonnie Geldmacher
is one of four Brigham Young
University employees to receive
the President’s Appreciation
Award in August 2011.
Geldmacher’s colleagues
describe her strongest traits as (1)
her consistent dedication to her
work, (2) her ability to prudently
economize in library purchasing,
(3) her devotion to her student

employees, and (4) her repeatedly
going the extra mile in many areas.
“Ms. Geldmacher is very adept
in supervising staff and student
workers,” says fellow law librarian
Galen Fletcher, ’93. “She was the
head of the Technical Services
Department at the law library
from 1998 to 2002, during which
time she coordinated the department’s successful migration to a
new library system while overseeing two faculty librarians, other
staff, and students. Her work was
recognized with the Law School
Employee Award in 2000.” He
adds, “Bonnie has been an absolute jewel in her efforts to train
and work with student employees
over the years. Her students stay
in touch with her because of
her care and focused attention
to them during their time here
and long after graduation. Every
summer, ex-employees stop by
specifically to see and thank her.”
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byu

law library faculty
David Armond,
’04, and Shawn Nevers, ’05, won
the aall Call for Papers Award in
the Open Division this year. They
presented their winning paper, “The
Practitioners’ Council: Connecting
Legal Research Instruction and
Current Legal Research Practice,”
at the annual conference of the
American Association of Law
Libraries in Philadelphia this past
July. Shawn Nevers previously
won the same award in the New
Members Division in 2007.
The article grew out of ideas
the two had discussed for ways to
improve teaching legal research
in first-year legal writing and
research classes. They wanted
input from practitioners who
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were using research skills every
day in their profession. In 2009
they invited lawyers to be part
of a Practitioners’ Council to
advise them about current legal
research practice.
“You mean you want to make
law school reflect what we actually do in practice?” an attorney
responded to their invitation to
be part of the council. Armond
and Nevers are experts in using a
variety of legal resources, but they
wanted a connection to current
legal research in law practice.
The council, made up of seven
practicing attorneys, now acts
as an advisory board regarding
current research practice and
provides real-world insight and
experiences to enhance teaching.

The council meets for lunch
with Armond and Nevers during
the year in brainstorming sessions
where differences between academic and client-based research
are highlighted. Practitioners have
shared what feature they use most
often in electronic researching,
skills they think new attorneys must
have, and ways to avoid the same
mistakes practitioners often make.
Armond and Nevers continue
to use the Practitioners’ Council
to inform their teaching. Their
perspective on assignments
has changed. “We found that
our checklist approach to legal
research skills needed more refinement. Not only would we need to
develop assignments that required
finding a statute, but also the exer-

cises would have to teach the student how to develop sensitivity for
how difficult the discovered statute
would be to apply. Not only would
time limits need to be part of the
micropracticums, but also we
would need to teach students to
be aware of how timing increases
the difficulty of assignments. The
Practitioners’ Council helped us
to understand the metacognitive
elements of a task we were likely
to take for granted.”
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N

ine graduates of J. Reuben
Clark Law School have been
called to serve as mission presidents throughout the world.
1 Jeffrey G. Boswell, ’76, with his
wife, Shirley J. Boswell, has been
called to preside over the Baltic
Mission. Boswell is a shareholder
with Kimble, MacMichael &
Upton in Fresno, California.
2 Jordan W. Clements, ’82, is
a managing partner of a private
equity investment firm. He and
his wife, Julie A. Clements,

are serving in the Minnesota
Minneapolis Mission.
3 Fred D. Essig, ’82, has been
called as mission president over
the Chile Santiago North Mission,
where he serves with his wife,
Mary Ann S. Essig. He is a partner
in the firm Dixon & Essig in Salt
Lake City.
4 David L. Glazier, ’81, shareholder at Kirton & McConkie in
Orem, Utah, is president of the
El Salvador San Salvador Mission
with his wife, Beverly B. Glazier.

5 Jon M. Jeppson, ’76, with his
wife, Bonnie B. Jeppson, serves
in the New Jersey Morristown
Mission. He is a cofounder of the
law firm Matheson, Mortensen,
Olsen & Jeppson in Salt Lake City.
6 Michael A. Neider, ’76, and his
wife, Rosemary C. Neider, preside
over the Nevada Las Vegas
Mission. He is president of Miro
Industries, Inc., in Sandy, Utah.
7 Evan A. Schmutz, ’82, a member manager of Hill, Johnson &
Schmutz in Provo, Utah, presides

over the Philippines Cebu Mission
with his wife, Cindy L. Schmutz.
8 Karl M. Tilleman, ’90, with his
wife, Holly B. Tilleman, is president of the Canada Vancouver
Mission. He is a managing partner
at Steptoe & Johnson llp in
Phoenix, Arizona.
9 Mark A. Wolfert, ’83, serves
in the Georgia Atlanta North
Mission with his wife, Carol A.
Wolfert. Residing in Orem,
Utah, he is partner and general
counsel for dōTerra International.
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life in the law

John Borrows, Drawing Out Law: A Spirit’s Guide
(university of toronto press, 2010)

>>>>>

Reviewed by Scott Cameron

I have long felt that the Clark Memorandum should be a vehicle for introducing the
writing of its members to the Law Society as a whole.
John Borrows was a visiting professor of law at byu Law School during fall
semester 2007. As a fellow of the Trudeau Foundation, he was able to work on two
of his books, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution (University of Toronto Press, 2009)
and its companion volume, Drawing Out Law: A Spirit’s Guide, during his semester
here. In the former volume, Borrows recognizes Canada as “a legally pluralistic state”
and seeks to explain the significant role that indigenous legal traditions should play
in Canada. The companion volume, Drawing Out Law, is an episodic narrative that
combines biography, oral tradition, dream, pictography, and theology to convey the
power of Borrows’ own Anishinabek legal heritage.
To demonstrate three strategies that contemporary indigenous people may employ in Canada, one of Borrows’
episodes describes a political meeting where indigenous candidates for Parliament relate their views. After the candidates speak, an elder relates the following:
In the old days, we used to weave lessons from the natural world into our teachings. Our leaders would expand our understanding
by telling stories. They understood that stories could appropriately combine reason and emotion when they correlated with one another.
We need more true stories to help us make sound decisions. . . . Our hearts and minds have to line up when we make a decision; these
men are not helping us. They [the candidates] are too one-sided, too focused on reason alone. Stories may be hard for some to understand, and may be too open-ended for others, but that’s part of their beauty. They generate innovation and creativity. They leave some
of the work in making judgments to those who are listening to them. Stories don’t force your mind to the speaker’s conclusions in the
same way that words alone do. Stories respect a person’s agency. I wish more of our people would function in this way again. [215]
Borrows follows the Elder’s advice; he weaves lessons from the natural world into his narrative. He informs the
“heart and mind” of the reader through stories, dreams, and pictographs. Drawing Out Law is an odyssey of the spirit
that the narrator, a young law professor, takes through the Four Hills of Life. The reader accompanies the professor
in his odyssey as he is guided to a deeper understanding of his Anishinabek culture and legal heritage by his grandparents, Nokomis and Mishomish. The reader is beckoned along with the professor to sit at their fire and hear their
stories—eventually being encircled in the Anishinabek worldview. As the narrative concludes, the young professor
watches Nokomis and Mishomish ascend the last hill, gaze back at their own valley, and see Anikee (Thunderbird).
The professor’s love for them is evident, and the reader’s admiration is transformed into reverence.
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